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As the world starts reopening following the lockdowns prompted by the 
COVID- 19 pandemic, regional collaborations and trade matters have 
resurfaced. While the Brexit (British exit from the EU) negotiations 
have dominated regional trade headlines, the fate of the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement is also being rethought. In all 
these, however, the issue of regional integration, administration, and 
governance of treaties and policies remain contentious areas. Considering 
these concerns, this article draws insights from the regionalization of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We 
explore the “isms” (that is, the ideologies of realism, neoliberalism, 
intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, and regionalism) that impact 
upon the achievement and implementation of the regional governance 
system. We analyze ECOWAS’ current strategy toward the integration 
of the West African region, its successes, and its failures. Also, we 
highlight some of the challenges concerning the implementation of 
treaties. Finally, we evaluate the underlying national preferences and the 
implications for the “isms” in many settings.
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Los “ismos” de la integración regional: ¿Qué tienen las preferencias 
interestatales subyacentes para la Unión de la CEDEAO?
A medida que el mundo comienza a reabrirse después de los recientes 
cierres provocados por la pandemia de COVID- 19, las colaboraciones 
regionales y los asuntos comerciales han resurgido. Si bien las 
negociaciones del Brexit (salida británica de la Unión Europea 
[UE]) dominan los titulares del comercio regional, también se está 
repensando el destino del Tratado de Libre Comercio Continental 
Africano (AfCFTA). En todos estos, sin embargo, la cuestión de 
la integración regional, la administración y la gobernanza de los 
tratados y las políticas siguen siendo áreas polémicas. Teniendo en 
cuenta estas preocupaciones, este artículo se basa en la regionalización 
de la Comunidad Económica de los Estados de África Occidental 
(CEDEAO). Exploramos los “ismos” (es decir, las ideologías del 
realismo, neoliberalismo, intergubernamentalismo, institucionalismo y 
regionalismo) que impactan en el logro e implementación del sistema de 
gobernanza regional. Analizamos la estrategia actual de la CEDEAO 
hacia la integración de la región de África Occidental, sus éxitos y 
fracasos. Además, destacamos algunos de los desafíos relacionados 
con la implementación de los tratados. Finalmente, evaluamos las 
preferencias nacionales subyacentes y las implicaciones para los “ismos” 
en muchos entornos.
Palabras Clave: Regionalismo, Integración, Realismo, Institucionalismo, 
Intergubernamentalismo, Neoliberalismo, Organizaciones regionales, 
Cambios en la política, Política comparada, Tratado de Libre Comercio 
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Regional organizations have been placed under increasing scrutiny, largely 
due to global economic, social, and environmental changes. Regionalism in 
Africa is of much importance to policy makers, international organizations, 
political analysts, and practitioners. The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) was formed on May 28, 1975, via a treaty in Lagos, 
Nigeria. It is now over four decades since the establishment of ECOWAS, 
yet there is considerable debate over its effectiveness (Dwyer 2015; Williams 
and Boutellis 2014). It is not clear what the main objective of ECOWAS is— 
trade, peacekeeping force, or regional governance? Also, it is not clear what 
are the underlying national preferences. Notwithstanding the portrayal of 
Africa as the most unstable continent in the world or a continent bedeviled by 
unpredictability and conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark 2018), the 
regional cooperation and integration of ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) 
is a manifestation that Africa is taking responsibility for its affairs and future 
(Gruber 2013; Kolo, Madichie, and Mbah 2019; Marchal 2013; Piccolino 2012; 
Rodriguez 2018; Straus 2012).
In contemporary politics, there is debate about the rise of intergovernmentalism 
and the applicability of grand theorizing (Smeets and Beach 2020). The underlying 
national preferences for joining regional organizations are either economic or 
geopolitical interests (Moravcsik 1998). Laursen (2008, 4) defined rationalism 
as “a process that leads to a certain state of affair and as the attainment, 
within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices 
strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable 
expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.” Joseph Grieco (1990, 35) 
buttresses that position, stating that “neo- liberalism essentially expects states 
to calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to 
maximize their utility because of [their own] preferences.” Arguably, while 
rationalism as a mode of analysis has lost much of its prominence, rationalism 
as symbolic politics is still very much alive and is still the most powerful theory 
of international politics (Copeland 2011; Saint- Martin and Allison 2011).
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In this article, we examine the practice and ideology of intergovernmentalism 
and realism in the achievement and implementation of ECOWAS policies and 
treaties. Debate on “intergovernmentalism has been moving in the direction of 
theoretical refinement, where more and more (sub)types were introduced: (old 
and ‘new’) ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ (LI), ‘new intergovernmentalism’ 
(NI), ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’, ‘intergovernmental union’, and even 
supernationalist intergovernmentalism” (Smeets and Beach 2020, 1138). The focus 
on ECOWAS is influenced by the paucity of empirical studies and the peculiarities 
of the region (Okoro et al. 2020). As a starting point, we reflect upon realism, 
neoliberalism, intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, and intergovernmentalism 
in regionalism connected to the “isms” alluded to in the title of this article. We 
examine the interplay of regional integration and political processes— particularly 
regarding the timing and sequence of events— to understand how these processes 
result in diverging patterns of policy change (Maags 2020).
Historical institutionalism, agenda setting, and policy learning approaches 
present different perspectives (Maags 2020). A prominent approach has been 
utilized to understand the mechanism of radical policy changes over the past 
years of ECOWAS’ existence. Borrowing from neoinstitutional theory (Ferry, 
Ahrens, and Khalifa 2019), we contend that ECOWAS, as an economic and 
peace- building organization, has been very successful in promoting interstate 
peace among its members. However, the organization has struggled with poor 
implementation of economic, monetary, trade policies, regional growth, and in 
dealing with internal- members’ conflicts and terrorism (e.g., Boko Haram— one 
of the largest Islamist militant groups in West Africa). Neoliberalism assumes 
states to share a natural preference for relative, absolute, or individual gains 
in their interactions with other nations (Keohane 1986). These assessments 
are grounded conceptually in this article, in comparative analysis, and in the 
evaluation of treaties and protocols on free trade, free movement, peace, and 
security architecture.
The year 2020 will be remembered as the year of the COVID- 19 pandemic 
that has strained the health, business, and social systems of nations globally, 
with the real economic impact becoming ever clearer. This adds urgency and 
scale to the collective and regional responses to economic, health, social, 
and environmental challenges concerning bilateral relationships, regional 
security, trade integration, and governance. Drawing upon a range of “isms”— 
regionalism, realism, and intergovernmentalism— we propose remedial courses 
of action for regional integration taken from the purview of ECOWAS. We 
first discuss the ideological approaches of realism and intergovernmentalism in 
regionalism. We then present the evaluation by examining ECOWAS membership, 
treaties, protocols, and policy changes. Next, we analyze ECOWAS’ underlying 
national preferences, institutional facilitation, and challenges. Conclusions and 
implications for regional integration round up the article.
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The Ideologies of Realism and Intergovernmentalism in Regionalism
Realism has dominated international relations theories. Charles Glaser’s 
Rationalist Theory of International Politics began in the mid- 1990s (Copeland 
2011, 441). Since then, classical theories of international cooperation and 
integration are rationalist and state- centered, stressing the difference between 
regional integration and regional cooperation (Søren 2010). Realist theory argues 
that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining 
effects on interstate cooperation as a fundamental pillar of international politics 
(Copeland 2011; Grieco 1988; Saint- Martin and Allison 2011). Theories of 
regional cooperation and integration, such as “new regionalism” (Sahakyan 
2016; Söderbaum 2012; Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010; Söderbaum and Shaw 
2003) and “non- Western approaches” (Acharya and Buzan 2017; Acharya and 
Johnston 2007), focus on states as the main drivers of regionalism that develops 
through the processes of formal institution building at the regional level. 
Historically, regional integration studies started with research on the European 
Union (EU) as the teleological model for other regions, or indeed the world, 
to adopt (Rosamond 2006). Integration was defined as: “the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new centre whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states” (Laursen 
2008, 5).
The assumption then was that, to succeed, other regional integration 
projects would have to try to emulate the EU as much as possible; not to do 
so could be taken as evidence of likely failure (Rosamond 2006). Realism’s 
identification reveals that the problem of the relative gain for cooperation is 
based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent 
actors (Grieco 1988). According to Grieco, neoliberalism assumes that states 
share a national preference for absolute or individual gains in their interactions 
with other nations, independent of those achieved by others. There is also a 
decline in trust in representative institutions (Torcal and Christmann 2019). 
Realism proposes that the international environment severely penalizes states 
if  they fail to protect their vital interests or if  they pursue objectives beyond 
their means; hence, states are “sensitive to costs” and behave as unitary- rational 
agents (Grieco 1988).
Hoffmann advanced the suggestion that “in areas of key importance to the 
national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self- controlled uncertainty, 
of national self- reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty” of integration 
(Laursen 2008, 4). Neoliberalism’s cooperation, institutionalism, and rationalism 
emphasizes the complex interdependence among states and their shared interests 
in dealing with the problems that arise at the regional level. In the 1990s, Andrew 
Moravcsik (1998) developed “liberal intergovernmentalism” to explain the 
process of integration in Europe, suggesting the combination of liberal theory 
to explain national preference formation and an intergovernmental theory of 
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interstate bargaining to explain substantive outcomes (cited in Laursen 2008, 
6). Intergovernmentalism is defined by Smeets and Beach (2020) as: (i) the legal 
shape of an agreement, as established outside the Community framework; (ii) 
the process, meaning a (more) prominent role of intergovernmental bodies or 
arenas in the decision making; and (iii) the outcomes, meaning the dominance 
of member states vis- à- vis the regional institutions in shaping the substance of 
these agreements.
Nation states want to maintain their relative position within the international 
system to improve their security and, thus, ensure their survival (Waltz 1979). 
The political- economic approaches and liberal theories of international 
cooperation provide more society- centered explanations for how globalization 
translates into regionalism. They take economic and social interests as the 
starting point (Solingen 2008). Whereas neoliberalists typically highlight the 
salience of absolute gains, neorealists by no means underestimate the value of 
absolute capabilities for states’ security, survival, and/or power accumulation 
(Mearsheimer 2001). These interests are channeled through the domestic political 
process of interest aggregation and interest representation. States are the master 
of regional organizations and gate- keep access to international decision- making 
processes. Andrew Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism (Figure 1) 
has become an important reference point for most studies on integration, 
especially the big decisions he refers to as “grand bargains” (Laursen 2008, 6).
Explaining the framework (Figure 1), Laursen (2008) maintains that the first 
stage concerns national preference formation. It examines whether economic 
or geopolitical interests dominate when the national preferences of member 
states are formed. The second stage, interstate bargaining, seeks to explain the 
efficiency and distributional outcomes of regional bodies’ negotiations. Offensive 
realists part with defensive neorealism in that they regard power maximization 
as the main driving force in international politics (Mearsheimer 2001). They 
likewise assert that “relative gains- concerns ultimately outweigh absolute gains- 
considerations in actors’ political thinking” (Mearsheimer 2001, 83).
Neorealists and neoliberalists always disagree over states’ natural preferences. 
On the one hand, the realist contention that political units invariably favor 
relative over absolute gains is disputable. On the other hand, the notion that 
neoliberal states are insensitive to how they fare with other nations appears 
even less plausible. Power- based approaches assume that, in the absence of a 
central enforcement power (anarchy), cooperation is risky for states that are 
concerned about the equal distribution of power among them (Baldwin 2013). 
The underlying national preferences could be how to maintain “relative” over 
“absolute” advantages. It could be the fear of survival. Such a rationale is implicit 
in neorealist thought. Donnelly (2000) posits that both power and security 
are inherently contingent on the development, increase, and sustainability of 
decidedly absolute capabilities, economic prosperity, and political independence. 
Arguably, the fact that “power is relative does not necessarily lead states to 
pursue relative gains” (Donnelly 2000, 61).
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One of the marked features of international politics has been the growth 
of regional groupings (Murdoch 2015). As such, the intergovernmentalism 
literature has connotations that go beyond the legal shape of— and formal 
involvement in— an agreement and the dominance of member states vis- à- 
vis regional institutions in shaping the substance of agreements (Smeets and 
Beach 2020). Nevertheless, the establishment of ECOWAS has been hailed as 
a breakthrough in international efforts to institute some form of economic 
cooperation and integration among West African nations (Ojo 1980). We 
assume that ideational and institutional processes impact upon regional 
governance at different points in time. Furthermore, “institutional forces create 
major constraints and opportunities that affect both the behaviour of actors 
and the diffusion of their ideas, it is the dynamic interaction between ideational, 
political, and institutional processes that determines policy change and, by 
extension, policy outcomes” (Maags 2020, 75).
Figure 1.  
International Cooperation: A Rationalist Framework 
Source: Moravcsik (1998; cited in Laursen 2008, 6).
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ECOWAS Membership, Treaties, and Protocols
Every intergovernmental system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the 
diversity of domestic determinants and geo- historical situations (Laursen 2008). 
ECOWAS was formed to foster interstate economic and political cooperation. 
In 1972, the then Nigerian head of state Gen yakubu Gowon and his Togolese 
counterpart Gnassingbe Eyadema toured the region in support of the integration 
idea. Most regional integration treaties include protocols on trade in goods, 
trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy, 
rules and procedures on the settlement of disputes, etc. The Treaty of Lagos in 
1975 establishing ECOWAS was originally touted as an economic initiative, but 
emerging political events led to its revision and therewith the expansion of scope 
and powers in 1993 (ECOWAS 2016).
Membership
ECOWAS is among the most populated regions of Africa— with a 
population of about 378 million people in 2016— and Nigeria makes up more 
than half  of the population with about 196 million (ECOWAS 2016). Currently, 
ECOWAS comprises 15 member countries (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea- Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo) and was formed in 1975. Hence, 
there are dramatic economic, political, and historical differences between the 
nations in the community (Harvey and Cushing 2015). ECOWAS was based on 
the realization of the need to further promote an economically integrated West 
Africa (Saka, Onafowokan, and Adebayo 2015). It is important to highlight 
that Cape Verde (or Cabo Verde) joined in 1976 and Mauritania left in 2000 
(Asongu, Folarin, and Biekpe 2019). The current Chairman of ECOWAS is His 
Excellency the Ghanaian President Akufo- Addo, elected during the 57th summit 
hosted by the outgoing ECOWAS Chairman, President Mahamadou Issoufou 
of Niger, at the Mahatma Gandhi International Conference Centre, Niamey, on 
September 7, 2020.
Treaty on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment
In May 1979, ECOWAS member states adopted their first protocol relating 
to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, four years 
after the promulgation of the ECOWAS treaty. The protocol offers the right 
of ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside, and establish economic activities in the 
territory of other member states. It outlined a three- phased approach to achieve 
the “complete freedom of movement” envisaged by the treaty. The Treaty’s Part 
II: General Principles on Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment 
(Article 2), specifies that ECOWAS citizens have the right to enter, reside, and 
establish in the territory of member states (ECOWAS Treaty). Table 1 describes 
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the major features of the Protocol and four Supplementary Protocols of 
ECOWAS on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment.
ECOWAS attempted to address the difficulties encountered in implementing 
the Supplementary Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of 
Residence and Establishment, and Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS). The 
difficulties revolved primarily around rules of origin, national participation in 
the equity capital of production enterprises, and the categorization of priority 
and nonpriority industrial products (African Development Bank [AfDB] 2019). 
Despite the treaties, close association, and a deep, multidimensional and peaceful 
relationship among member states, challenges and sources of conflict remain. 
Against this background, one has to question the treaties and protocols on Free 
Movement of Persons and Right of Residence, given the lack of an effective and 
efficient mechanism to check and control illegal activities across the borders. 
On August 19, 2019, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari unexpectedly 
closed Nigeria’s borders with Benin and Niger, declaring the time had come to 
end rampant smuggling from those countries (Mehouenou 2019). The Nigerian 
president defended the closure by saying Benin and Niger had failed to police 
their borders properly and chronic smuggling was the result (Mehouenou 2019).
The defeat of the constitutional treaty is a defeat of direct democracy and 
the underlying principles of regional integration (Laursen 2008). Unilateral 
border closures go against the protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the 
Right of Residence, Establishment, and Trade Liberalization. The closure of 
Nigerian borders to protect their country’s economy was in contradiction to the 
ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and raises the issue of regional integration 
by restricting not only the free movement of persons within the subregion, but 
also restricting economic activities. This action spelt doom for the millions of 
community citizens whose livelihoods depend on the daily movement of trade 
Table 1. Treaty on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment
1979 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment
• Sets outright of Community citizens to enter, reside, and establish in territory of member 
states (Article 2(1)).
• Establishes a three- phased approach over 15 years to implementation of (I) right of entry 
and abolition of visas, (II) residence, and (III) establishment (Article 2).
• Conditions entitlement to enter the territory of a member state on possession of valid 
travel document and international health certificate (Article 3(1)).
• Reserves right of member states to refuse admission into the territory of Community 
citizens deemed inadmissible under domestic law (Article 4).
• Establishes some requirements for expulsion (Article 11).
• Confirms that Protocol does not operate to detriment of more favorable provisions in 
other agreements concluded by member states (Article 12).
Source: Adepoju, Boulton, and Levin (n.d., 2).
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across the borders. For Nigeria’s neighboring countries, traders say the impact 
has been devastating (Mehouenou 2019).
The notion of “national interest” plays a pivotal role in the discourse of state 
action. The national interest has neither been self- justificatory nor arbitrary 
within the conventions of the ECOWAS treaties until now. Nigeria has made 
dramatic foreign policy decisions that may change both the African regional 
landscape and the behavior of other states. Nigeria and Ghana hold a hegemonic 
power over the historical trajectory of the ECOWAS. Hegemony depicts 
overwhelming or preponderant material power or the exercise of some form 
of leadership, including domination, over others. The notion of overwhelming 
power, dominance, and the exercise of leadership capture the Nigerian role and 
position since the formation of ECOWAS. Neorealists argued that states in the 
regional set- up maintain individual gains and the extent to which states pursue 
relative gains is inextricably related to their strategic environment so that it will 
vary from situation to situation (Powell 1994).
Treaty on Trade, Commerce, and Investment
The underlying interstate preferences are either economic or political 
cooperation. The ECOWAS member states agreed to establish a customs union 
by 1990 that would enable the free movement of capital and goods. Arguably, 
ECOWAS is among the major African Regional Economic Communities that 
has been shaping the evolution of regional integration in Africa. According to 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD 2018, 
iii): “The ECOWAS Treaty states that the common market should be ensured 
through ‘liberalization of trade among the Member States by… removing non- 
tariff  barriers to establish a free trade area at the community level… [and] the 
removal, among the Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of… 
goods.’”
The ECOWAS trade policy is meant to foster the smooth integration of the 
region into the world economy (ECOWAS 2016). In 2010, ECOWAS adopted 
its “West African Common Industrial Policy.” The total trade of the region has 
averaged $208.1 billion (ECOWAS 2016). Exports are projected at approximately 
$137.3 billion while the imports total is about $80.4 billion (ECOWAS 2016). 
The elimination of tariff  and nontariff  barriers to trade is at the core of their 
respective programs to foster freer trade and the free movement of the factors 
of production. According to UNCTAD (2018), trade and exports to member 
states and other regional blocs have been on a steady rise and between 1975 and 
2010 the figures have more than quadrupled. ECOWAS trade has increased by 
an average of 18 percent per year between 2005 and 2014 (ECOWAS 2016). The 
main active countries in trade include Nigeria (which accounts for approximately 
76 percent of total trade), followed by Ghana (9.2 percent), and Côte d’Ivoire 
(8.64 percent) (ECOWAS 2016).
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One of the key policies of ECOWAS is its “trade liberalization” program. 
The objective is to progressively establish a “customs union” among the member 
states of the community. In line with this objective, intra- ECOWAS trade 
accounted for nearly 12 percent of total ECOWAS trade in 2016 (AfDB 2019). 
A key target is to increase the share of intraregional trade from currently around 
12 percent of total trade to 40 percent in 2030, with a vision to “maintain a 
solid industrial structure, which is globally competitive, environment- friendly 
and capable of significantly improving the living standards of the people by 
2030” (OECD, 2012, 416).
UNCTAD (2018) reveal the share of the intraregional trade by exports that 
show that Nigeria has 44.6 percent and Côte d’Ivoire 25.7 percent. Imports are 
more evenly distributed among the four countries of Ghana (25.7 percent), Côte 
d’Ivoire (18.4 percent), Nigeria (14.0 percent), and Burkina Faso (11.3 percent). 
The top ten key products of intra- ECOWAS trade in 2015 included: petroleum 
products and by- products (with a share of 48.3 percent, US$4,847 million); lime, 
cement, and fabrics (excluding glass and clay) (3.4 percent, US$342 million); 
tobacco (2.5 percent, US$250 million); edible products and preparations (2.4 
percent, US$242 million); perfumery and cosmetics (excluding soaps) (2.3 
percent); fixed vegetable fats and oils (crude and refined) (2.2 percent); articles 
and plastics (2.2 percent); electric current (1.8 percent); and footwear (1.5 
percent) (UNCTAD 2018).
In Accra, on July 10, 2014, the ECOWAS heads of state announced their 
decision to endorse the EU- ECOWAS (plus Mauritania) Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). Since then, all EU member states and most of the 16 
ECOWAS nations have signed the EPA. The EPA will result in the gradual 
opening of Ghana’s market to 75 percent of the tariff  lines, equivalent to around 
65 percent of the value of imports from the EU, by 2035 (Macleod et al. 2015). 
In the West African region, the regional integration process by free and open 
border trade has become defective. Informal cross- border trade (ICBT) is 
pervasive along West African regional borders. It has a long history, given the 
region’s artificial and often porous borders, a long history of regional trade, 
weak border enforcement, corruption, and, perhaps most importantly, lack of 
coordination of economic policies among neighboring countries (Mbaye 2019).1 
Some of the states, like the Benin economy, depend on imports of food 
commodities and automobiles, which end up smuggled into neighboring states, 
thereby undermining the economic policies of affected states. According to 
Golub, Mbaye, and Golubski (2019), Benin has adopted a strategy focused on 
being an entrepôt state: that is, serving as a trading hub, importing goods and 
re- exporting them legally but most often sent illegally to Nigeria, thus profiting 
from distortions in Nigeria’s economy.
1 Mbaye (2019) notes that ICBT takes several forms, not all of which are illegal. For example, 
trade in traditional agricultural products and livestock in bordering countries may involve little or 
no intent to deceive the authorities, as peasants and herders ignore artificial and unpoliced 
borders.
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The agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) that came into force on May 30, 2019, is a welcome development. 
One of the key objectives of the AfCFTA is to “create a single market for 
goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the 
economic integration of the African continent” and following the Pan African 
Vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” enshrined in Agenda 
2063 (African Union 2018). It has been estimated that AfCFTA will generate 
Africa annual income gains of $134 billion per year, as it creates the largest 
free trade area by the number of countries with an amalgamated market size 
worth more than $3 trillion, consumer business spending of over $6.7 trillion, 
and the free movement of about 1.3 billion people (Chuku 2020). However, the 
implementation of the agreement has been shifted beyond the July 1, 2020 target 
due to disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
According to UNCTAD (2018), regional integration presents unique 
opportunities to drive Africa’s transformation and development. It appears that 
ECOWAS member states have different national interests. As stated earlier, the 
announcement from the Nigerian government to close borders on August 19, 
2019 cast a shadow over a historic free trade agreement and was signed by 54 out 
of 55 African countries, reaching a key operational threshold (Mehouenou 2019). 
As explained earlier, unilateral border closures go against all the commercial 
and freedom of movement treaties of ECOWAS. Bouillon (2019) notes that the 
two main commodities being smuggled across Nigerian borders were petrol and 
rice. Petrol was being sneaked out from Nigeria— where subsidies make the fuel 
half  as cheap as in its neighboring countries— and resold. Moreover, rice was 
being brought into Nigeria from Benin via its port in Cotonou, as Nigerians 
favor imported Asian- grown varieties over the locally grown products.
As explained earlier concerning underlying national preferences, power- 
based approaches assume sometimes that cooperation is risky for states. Under 
this condition upholding relative over absolute advantages becomes the order. 
The most visible winner from the closure of the borders is the Nigerian treasury, 
which has benefited from the falling cost of petrol subsidies and a rise in customs 
receipts from the authorized ports. Some scholars argue that the contemporary 
regional and global order is in crisis (Baldwin, Chen, and Cole 2019; Eilstrup- 
Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2019). Attempts to challenge the global or regional 
economy with such discrete revolutionary visions dominate. Realist and 
neorealist approaches focus on the capabilities of states that are often limited 
to dyadic or bilateral relations. Dissatisfaction with regional politics may, for 
instance, have contributed to the Brexit vote (the United Kingdom deciding 
to leave the EU). Mauldin (2016) suggests that three main factors led to this 
outpouring of votes to leave the EU: (i) economics— opponents of the EU 
argued that it is a dysfunctional economic entity; (ii) sovereignty— the rise of 
nationalism across the world; and (iii) political elitism— the political leadership 
of Britain faced a profound loss.
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In the case of ECOWAS, the Treaty of Lagos in 1975 establishing ECOWAS 
was originally touted as an economic initiative, but emerging political and economic 
events and historical differences between the nations in the community constrain 
the implementation of agreed trade reforms that interfere with the objectives of the 
treaties. The propensity for relative capabilities might indeed sooner or later take 
precedence. Understanding state interests (economic, security, trade, territorial 
acquisition, etc.) and the various factors conditioning that process of interest 
development will nevertheless help to reverse the global disorder on regionalism.
Treaty on Monetary Union
The introduction of the Euro as the single currency of the EU as a means 
of facilitating economic regional integration and development has led other 
regional organizations to establish a process of convergence like that of the EU as 
prerequisites for wider monetary integration. According to Saka, Onafowokan, 
and Adebayo (2015, 230), monetary integration is considered important in 
international economic relations because:
It plays important roles in the addressing of the problems of a multiplicity 
of currencies and exchange rate regime that often hinders trade flows 
between countries. The expected benefits of such a union include 
the promotion of trade; creation of larger market and widening of 
business/trade- related income- earning opportunities for the citizenry 
for improvement of their standard of living; facilitation of unhindered 
movements of persons and labor in the sub- region through the dismantling 
of barriers, thereby strengthening cultural, economic, social, and political 
cooperation (common central bank, judiciary, parliament, etc.); creation 
of a more favorable environment for collective pooling of resources for 
the development of essential regional infrastructure and enhancement 
of economic competitiveness, derivation of the economies of scale, and 
reduction in transactions costs.
A comprehensive understanding of  the robustness of  monetary policy in a 
potential monetary union is essential in the process of  economic integration 
toward a common currency area (Asongu, Folarin, and Biekpe 2019; Asongu, 
Nwachukwu, and Tchamyou 2017). According to Asongu, Folarin, and Biekpe 
(2019), the idea of  using a single currency across the region was reiterated and 
further articulated in July 1991 by member states. Under the auspices of  the 
new agreement, a process of  monetary integration was proposed to be adopted 
in two stages (Asongu, Folarin, and Biekpe 2019). The heads of  states of  six 
African non- CFA countries agreed to join the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU),2 as part of  the first stage. For the second stage, 
2 WAEMU- UEMOA is a customs and currency union of eight countries that are all members of 
ECOWAS, promoting economic integration among members. The member states are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
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it was proposed that non- WAEMU countries (Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Nigeria) will build their monetary area, which was first called West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) (Diop, Tillmann, and Winker 2017). Then, 
WAMZ and WAEMU should be merged to form a single monetary zone in 
ECOWAS with the adoption of  the common currency in 2020 (see e.g., Diop, 
Tillmann, and Winker 2017). While the first and second stages were expected 
to be realized in 2015 and 2020, respectively, in July 2014, the ambition of 
materializing the first stage was postponed (Asongu, Folarin, and Biekpe 
2019). “This postponement is the fourth, given the three initial postponements 
in 2003, 2005 and 2009. The main justification put forward for the underlying 
postponement has centred on the absence of  convergence among member 
states and insufficient preparation by member states” (Asongu, Folarin, and 
Biekpe 2019, 485).
Therefore, the attempt to set up the WAEMU has been unsuccessful and the 
objective is yet to be fully implemented. Masson and Pattillo (2001) argued that 
the objective of the monetary union should not be allowed to distract attention 
from addressing the serious domestic problems faced by countries in the region, 
which will mainly be resolved by “putting one’s house in order” and opening 
up the economies externally. Asongu, Nnanna, and Tchamyou (2020) highlight 
three motives for inquiring on the comparative African regional economies: 
notably, the growing relevance of regional integration, concerns of surplus 
liquidity, and ongoing debates surrounding the effects of globalization. Laursen 
(2008) explains that the first stage in international cooperation, according to 
the rationalist framework, concerns national preference formation (economic 
or geopolitical preferences). As we alluded earlier, neoliberalists highlight 
that interests are channeled through the domestic political process of interest 
aggregation and interest representation. It is, therefore, not in the interest of the 
individual countries of ECOWAS to enter a monetary union now or in the near 
future, unless the economies of these countries converge further (Harvey and 
Cushing 2015).
Treaty on Peace and Security
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security was adopted in December 
1999. It addresses peacekeeping, humanitarian support, and peacebuilding 
capabilities as well as the issue of cross- border crime and it also provided a 
supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In contrast 
to currently held views, regional peace and intervention in wars were not the 
initial motives for forming ECOWAS. The Treaty of 1975 envisaged the group 
as an economic community to promote among member states cooperation and 
development in all fields of economic activity. It is significant to note that no 
reference was made to defense or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles (The 
Conversations 2017). It could be argued that ECOWAS’ gradual movement 
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into security started in 1978 when ECOWAS adopted the nonaggression Treaty 
that called on member states to “refrain from the threat and use of force or 
aggression against each other” (Kabia 2011, 2).
ECOWAS was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian 
and military rulers in the region (The Conversations 2017). The period was 
characterized by an extensive involvement of the military in the political process 
and nations accusing one another of supporting dissidents, separationists, or 
warlords. Notably, the Treaty of Lagos in 1975 did not contain components 
relating to the issues of peace, security, stability, and governance according to 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Against this backdrop, 
the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of 
protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states (The 
Conversations 2017). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) was signed in May 1981 as was the Protocol on Mutual Assistance 
Defense (MAD) against any armed threat or aggression on a member state. 
This led to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group Allied Armed Forces. Critics regard this protocol as merely 
idealistic as it failed to provide an institutionalized response mechanism in the 
case of a breach (Kabia 2011, 2).
This collaboration must work well if economic cooperation and peace 
operations are to be effective (Williams and Boutellis 2014). Since the 1960s, 
when most countries in the West African subregion gained political freedom from 
colonial powers, the regional nations have adopted a variety of political systems, 
including multiparty democracy, one- party systems, and military autocracies (The 
Conversations 2017). Political scientists have long agreed that, after a long historical 
process of consolidation, wealthy democracies could remain stable indefinitely 
(Facchini and Melki 2019). However, recent events suggest that this may no longer 
be the case due to the direct effects of the economic crisis and its social consequences 
(Torcal and Christmann 2019). One of the achievements of the regional body is that 
ECOWAS has been a standby force in the member states, which can be deployed 
rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating (The Conversations 2017, 2).
The West African region has developed a reputation for military coups 
more than anywhere else on the continent (Kabia 2011). Besides, conflicts in 
the region have been notably fueled by multiple interrelated causal factors 
including poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, 
ethnic marginalization, and small arms proliferation (Annan 2014). Since 
its inauguration, ECOWAS’ core strategy has focused on the promotion of 
economic development and prosperity of member states. However, following 
widespread conflict and instability in the subregion in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
a realization grew that economic prosperity cannot be achieved in the absence of 
peace and security (Kabia 2011).
Given the history of the conflict in the West African subregion and previous 
unarticulated measures to address the challenges of conflict and wars, ECOWAS 
has recently come up with Plans of Action (PoA). At the ECOWAS headquarters, 
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in Abuja, Nigeria, on January 28, 2019, the PoA of ECOWAS’ Conflict Prevention 
Framework (ECPF) was launched. The PoA aims to create a platform for all 
ECPF Focal Point Directorates to strategize on the improvement of conflict 
prevention blueprints and to enhance effective cross- departmental collaboration, 
cooperation, and capacity building (ECOWAS 2016). The Framework’s 15 
components involving peace- building mechanisms, provide, among other things, 
tools for strengthening regional and national capacities for preventing violent 
conflicts or their recurrence in the region (Kabia 2011). ECOWAS (2016) states 
that the PoA drives the activities of the components which include: early warning, 
preventive diplomacy, democracy, and political governance, human rights and 
the rule of law, media, natural resource governance, cross- border initiatives, 
and security governance, women, peace and security, youth empowerment, the 
ECOWAS Standby Force, humanitarian assistance, and peace education (culture 
of peace), as well as the enabling mechanisms for these.
ECOWAS’ political leaders intended to establish the regional body at the 
time the region faced numerous internal political conflicts. Consequently, one of 
the key achievements of ECOWAS has revolved around the institutionalization 
of stable democracy in the region. An exception is the coup in Mali in 2012 where 
ECOWAS gave a 72- hour ultimatum to the coup leaders to relinquish power or 
face sanctions. The regional body proposed measures such as land borders and 
the freezing of assets and placed a peacekeeping force on standby (BBC 2012). 
This trend has continued as the power tussle in Mali has recurred more recently— 
leading to the delegation of an ECOWAS peace envoy in the person of former 
President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria (Premium Times 2020), to mediate 
between President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and opposition leaders toward 
resolving the worsening sociopolitical situation in Mali. However, mediation has 
not been able to resolve Mali’s political and economic crisis. On August 18, 2020 
Mali’s president, who has been accused of corruption and mishandling the deadly 
violence associated with Islamic extremists, was toppled by a military coup.
Integration is also seen as a political process (Grieco 1988; Laursen 2008). 
Regional integration helps countries reap other noneconomic benefits, such as 
peace and security. States have different preferences or priorities for regional 
integration, depending on their economy, geography, or preferences for sovereignty. 
However, inadequate policies and institutions may lead to inefficient outcomes. 
Also, reducing inter and intrastate conflict could be fundamental to achieving 
regional peace and security. It appears that regional treaties focus too much on 
the importance of trade liberalization and economic growth while focusing less 
on the drivers of political and social inclusiveness or sensitivities to liberalization.
ECOWAS Institutional Facilitation and Challenges
The decision- making process in regional integration can be efficient and 
the common institutions established can be more or less adequate (institutional 
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capacity) (Laursen 2008). The rationale behind regional trade integration is 
that small nations need to work together to build and integrate their economies, 
encourage economies of scale, and have more political and economic weight 
in trade negotiations (Karaki and Verhaeghe 2018). A more compelling 
explanation, we believe, is not to view the free movement and free trade as 
effective to economic integration and growth. This is related to the claim that free 
trade has transformed, and will continue to transform, the world for the better 
(Boussebaa 2019). The EU has become one of the most important advocates of 
a deep trade agenda at the multilateral and regional levels (Leblond and Viju- 
Miljusevic 2019). Imperial revivalism goes hand- in- hand with nations pursuit of 
free trade with “emerging markets,” in an effort— aimed at maintaining access to 
those markets and ensuring the country’s various monopolies, much like in the 
days of the Empire— to continue to dominate the world economy (Boussebaa 
2019).
The importance of regional integration in fostering economic growth is 
reflected in the ability of trade to engender structural transformation for countries 
in a trade bloc or single market (AfDB 2019). ECOWAS offers an existing and 
feasible regional framework for action in West Africa (Haysom 2014). However, 
the costs of trade are particularly high in the region (Chambers, Foresti, and 
Harris 2012). The costs or ease of doing business varies according to the member 
states, as shown by the World Bank’s (2020) “Doing Business” indicators. Not 
surprisingly, ECOWAS nations have recorded the worst performance in terms of 
ranking of doing business topics— ranked in the lower quarter of all indicators 
with the highest ranking of Getting Credit (122 out of 191) and lowest ranking 
Getting Electricity (160 out of 191) (World Bank 2016, 2).
Due to the external aggression and internal instability in the region, ECOWAS 
leaders moved to adopt measures to safeguard the subregion’s security (Kabia 
2011). Consequently, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council adopted 
an ECPF in 2008 (ECOWAS 2016). The first response of the regional body and 
neighboring states was to try to mediate a resolution to Mali’s political crisis. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018), maintains that ECOWAS has 
developed a sophisticated Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) 
that collects information on potential conflict dynamics from the member states, 
making use of formalized agreements with civil society organizations.
The future of ECOWAS and the West African region remains uncertain but 
promising. Also, the underlying interstate preferences (i.e., regional power, trade, 
political, or security) is not clear. Regional integration theory emphasizes a sense 
of community and institutions and practices. It could be argued that the founding 
fathers of ECOWAS were inspired by this notion. Collective decision making 
is an important aspect of all regional integration (Laursen 2008). ECOWAS 
is nevertheless struggling to successfully copy western models of regionalism, 
which has become problematic in recent years. ECOWAS’ institutional changes 
have been too slow or insufficient to bring about radical regional integration 
and economic transformation. A key assumption of neoinstitutional theory has 
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been institutional determinism supported by stable organizing principles and 
frames of meaning (Ferry, Ahrens, and Khalifa 2019). An underlying ECOWAS 
states preference is either economic or geopolitical interests (Moravcsik 1998).
In a recent article, Asongu, Nnanna, and Tchamyou (2020, 1- 2) explored 
“the role of globalization- fueled regionalization policies on the financial 
allocation efficiency of four economic and monetary regions in Africa from 
1980 to 2008.” These authors built upon a previous article (Asongu, Folarin, 
and Biekpe 2019, 483) that examined “the stability of money demand in the 
proposed West African Monetary Union (WAMU)” using “annual data for 
the period 1981 to 2015 from thirteen of the fifteen countries making- up the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”
At the time of writing, we are currently in September 2020 and AfCFTA 
remains a work- in- progress due to the ongoing COVID- 19 pandemic, travel 
restrictions, and lockdown. As the ambition of transiting into a monetary union 
gathers momentum, ECOWAS policy makers need to be mindful of the shaky 
structures upon which that ambition is being set. They cannot assume that 
success is a given due to the existence of the Dakar (Senegal)- based Central Bank 
of West African States (BCEAO) backed initially by France and then the EU.3
In keeping with the idea of the “isms” of regional theories, realism presents 
a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of 
the capabilities of international institutions. A major challenge for ECOWAS 
remains that of the financial burden associated with political and military 
missions and/or interference. ECOWAS peacekeeping interventions in West 
African countries, though they might have saved some lives, can largely be 
categorized as failures (Rodriguez 2018). As noted by Odobo, Andekin, and 
Udegbunam (2017), at the level of conflict prevention, the ECOWAS Protocol 
on Democracy and Good Governance prescribes measures urging its member 
countries to respect democratic principles, which would go a long way toward 
ensuring that conflicts do not arise. However, the problems of bad governance 
and corruption remain rife across the member states.
Another challenge is the absence of an effective system of power delegation; 
hence, much administrative bureaucracy is preserved. Ending wars and 
conflicts, especially in West Africa, has been quite a challenge due to its complex 
multicausal factors, multiple actors, and the nature of the conflicts; often 
contributing to prolonging conflicts (Annan 2014). Insufficient training, lack of 
support of the peacekeeping missions, lack of preparation, and misperceptions 
about the severity of the conflict at early stages of the mission have always been 
the challenges. This “seriously weakened” morale among the soldiers (Dwyer 
2015). The relationship between ECOWAS, the UN, and the AU has been 
characterized by considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension— often hindering 
3 The common issuing institution of the member states of the WAMU. At the time of its founding 
on May 12, 1962, its membership comprised the Republics of Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Mali, 
Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta.
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the predictability and conduct of effective peace operations (Williams and 
Boutellis 2014). For instance, during the Malian crisis, African players were 
accused in Paris of wanting to benefit from the crisis and of not being interested 
in solving it (Marchal 2013). A similar trend was observed in the politics of 
Western Sahara (see e.g., Madichie 2002).
Conclusion
The political- economic strategy and liberal theories of international 
cooperation provide reasons why nations go into regionalization. The underlying 
national preferences include economic, social, security, trade, or territorial power. 
Utilizing a case study of ECOWAS, this article applied some of the “isms” of 
regional integration theories (i.e., realism, neoliberalism, intergovernmentalism, 
institutionalism, and intergovernmentalism) to examine the practice and ideology 
of regional cooperation, the achievement and implementation of regional 
policies and treaties. Our evaluation reveals that ECOWAS may not have lived 
up to its mandate. Arguably, some success in regionalism has been achieved. 
However, such success appears to be limited in its scope. Conceptually, the term 
“regionalism” has been given a variety of meanings related to international 
cooperation in economic, political, and security areas. By taking the regionalism 
approach, we examined the supranational level of territorial dimensions and the 
processes of liberal intergovernmentalism.
ECOWAS has been struggling to bring about the radical regional integration 
of West Africa with other economic blocs. The liberalization program has failed 
to achieve the desired results. In consequence, regional economic development 
has been slow. Reflecting on the treaties, Nigeria’s border closure in 2019 
was in defiance of ECOWAS treaties on trade liberalization and freedom of 
movement signed by member states. Furthermore, the ECOWAS region is 
battling terrorism and internal security challenges. There is insecurity across the 
Sahel. Currently, there is a threat to security posed by activities of Boko Haram 
in North- Western Nigeria, Niger, and at the Cameroon border. In the North- 
Western, North- Eastern, and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria, clashes between 
bandits and Fulani herdsmen- farmers have degenerated beyond the control of 
internal security. The combined activities of Boko Haram, the armed bandits, 
and the armed Fulani herdsmen have left thousands of people murdered and 
millions displaced. Recently, U.S. intelligence warned that al Qaeda is expanding 
to Nigeria and penetrating other parts of West Africa.
Over the past 20 years, regional integration and trade negotiations— whether 
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral— have increasingly taken the center stage 
in global politics. The theory and practice of “regional integration” describe 
the kind of international integration that seeks to examine the source of 
underlying national preferences. The interests could be economic or geopolitical. 
Whichever way, we suggest in this article that the institutional choice should be 
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based on substantive agreement, which explains the transfer of sovereignty to 
international institutions. ECOWAS should, therefore, reorganize and re- develop 
robust institutions and programs to realize the commitments of the treaties and 
protocols— including the Mediation and Security Council, ECOWARN, the 
ECOWAS Standby Force, ECPF, and civil society. In contrast to currently held 
views, regional peace and security intervention were not the motives for forming 
ECOWAS. Rather, the regional body started as an economic integration union. 
However, indicators for performance in the ECOWAS region have produced 
mixed results. The economic relationship between the members of ECOWAS is 
asymmetric, with Nigeria and Ghana exerting the most influence.
ECOWAS should also pursue trade agreements that more fully take into 
account the dimensions of economic development and investments. New EPAs 
need to be signed between the ECOWAS and other regional trade blocs. ECOWAS 
should push for the new trade policy to grant 100 percent duty and quota- free 
access to the EU market in contrast to the limited access provided by the current 
EU- Africa EPAs. Future trade deals need, likewise, to be more pro- development 
and pro- industrialization than trade facilitating and rent seeking. ECOWAS 
should also focus on multilateral and bilateral public- private partnerships that 
encourage a five- way dialogue among businesses in West Africa, the African 
continent, and the EU or the United Kingdom. These platforms would facilitate 
the necessary guarantees to take on high- profile investments and trade along 
diversified product lines. AfCFTA can help address bottlenecks to the free 
movement of persons, goods, and human capital within Africa, making it easier 
for business owners, managers, and investors to travel, invest, and pull together 
resources.
Attempts to set up the WAEMU have been unsuccessful. The establishment 
of a common monetary union in the region is an integral part of the vision of the 
founding actors, but this vision has yet to be realized. Though trade and exports 
to member states and other regional blocs have been on a steady rise since the 
establishment of the treaty, the region falls behind other African regions when 
measured by economic progress. The costs of trade are particularly high in the 
region. The economy is heavily dependent on the informal sector and trade is 
impeded by severe cross- border smuggling and illicit transactions. This article 
argues that ECOWAS has been successful in promoting political democracy, 
trade integration, peace, and security in the region— yet member states’ internal 
and domestic political crises remain critical challenges (e.g., political crisis, 
election rigging, human rights abuses, lack of separation of powers, corruption 
in public offices, and high rate of absolute poverty, etc.).
Policy change must occur through policy- orientated learning and change 
in core beliefs. We have argued that ECOWAS has struggled with poor policy 
implementation: especially surrounding the free movement of persons, goods, 
services, and trade liberalization. The union has also struggled with the poor 
communication of its culturally and historically colonized and diverse members. 
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ECOWAS should similarly embrace policies based on strong coalitions and the 
use of technical information. The negotiated agreements between ECOWAS, AU, 
EU, and other regional bodies needs to be solid. There must be a comprehensive 
and cohesive approach between ECOWAS, AU, and western governments in 
tackling insecurity across the continent.
This article calls for reflection on the activities of ECOWAS and the 
gaps between its establishing mandate and its milestones. Cognizant of the 
limitations of this article, we anticipate that future research would find it worthy 
to examine the changing pattern of regionalism— especially as nations begin 
to restart their economies after the COVID- 19 pandemic, which has already 
killed tens of thousands of people in many countries. The “isms” of the regional 
integration theory lenses may provide some common ground and ideas for 
future studies. As things currently stand, the views of globalization naysayers 
may have transitioned or transported to the alternatives found in regionalism, 
neoliberalism, and intergovernmentalism. Indeed, ECOWAS is not alone in this 
developing trajectory, as we have witnessed from experiences in Europe (Brexit) 
and the renegotiated NAFTA— with U.S. President Trump building walls to 
keep Mexico out.
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